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CASE COMMENTS
Workers' Compensation-ExPANDING THE Victor Wine RULE To
INCLUDE ALL INTERNAL FAILURES OF THE CARDIOVASCULAR
SYSTEM-Richard E. Mosca & Co. v. Mosca, 362 So. 2d 1340 (Fla.
1978).
In 1975 Richard E. Mosca, president of the Richard E. Mosca &
Co., Inc. construction company, was under emotional stress as a
result of the financial difficulties of his business. Because of the
decline in business Mosca had been forced to replace the company
secretary with his wife, move the business office into his home, and
take other measures to reduce overhead. On October 2, 1975, Mosca
accompanied one of the company salesmen to a business meeting
to assist in securing a lucrative sales contract on which the financial
stability of the company rested. The meeting began with the poten-
tial customer severely criticizing Mosca for the way a previous sales
order had been handled. The contract negotiations continued for
four hours in a strained and tense atmosphere, when, while holding
a sample book and explaining various details to the buyer, Mosca
suddenly collapsed as a result of a middle cerebral artery aneurysm
rupture. I
The Judge of Industrial Claims awarded compensation to Mosca
for his disability; this order was affirmed by the Industrial Relations
Commission. The Florida Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the lower decisions in Richard E. Mosca & Co. v. Mosca,2
holding that the rule from Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley,3
which previously had been applied only to heart attack cases,
should be expanded to include cases involving internal failures of
other parts of the cardiovascular system. The Victor Wine standard
required that, for a heart attack to be compensable, the employee
must have been involved in an employment-related activity requir-
ing unusual physical strain not customary to the employee's work.'
The supreme court in Mosca noted that it was receding from its
holding in Tracy v. Americana Hotel, in which the court found a
ruptured aneurysm to be compensable when the "[c]laimant sus-
tained her injury as an unexpected result flowing from the perform-
ance of her employment activity."5
1. Richard E. Mosca & Co. v. Mosca, 362 So. 2d 1340, 1341 (Fla. 1978).
2. Id. at 1340.
3. 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
4. Id. at 588-89.
5. 234 So. 2d 641, 642 (Fla. 1970).
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Prior to the Mosca decision, Florida law had determined com-
pensability for the rupture of an aneurysm by using the same
standard applicable to other internal physiological failures,6
namely, that an injury is compensable when it occurs by accident
as a result of employment.7 Since Gray v. Employers Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance Co.," Florida has recognized unexpected results as
being within the definition of accident and thus compensable under
Florida's workers' compensation law. In Gray, a waffle cook injured
her arm when she lifted a five-gallon can of waffle batter. Although
she was totally disabled for three weeks, the claimant was originally
denied compensation because the Deputy Commissioner found no
accident.' The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was
not necessary that the injury be from an unexpected cause, but only
that there be an unexpected result. 0 The Florida Legislature subse-
quently amended the law in 1953 to incorporate the court's holding
in Gray. 11
Since the ruling in Gray that internal physiological injuries were
compensable, Florida claimants who had suffered such internal in-
juries as a herniated disc, 2 a knee injury, 3 cataracts, 4 and a her-
nia, 15 have been awarded compensation benefits. However, com-
pensability for heart attacks was limited under a special rule estab-
lished in 1962 by the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Victor
Wine.
Victor Wine involved a claimant who suffered a heart attack while
6. See, e.g., Tracy v. Americana Hotel, 234 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1970); Direct Oil Corp. v.
Coleman, 216 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
7. Workers' compensation benefits are awarded for disability or death which occurs as a
result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1)
(1977). An "injury" is personal injury or death by accident. Id. § 440.02(6). An "accident" is
an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly. Id. § 440.02(18).
8. 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1953).
9. Id. at 651.
10. The court stated:
It is enough, then, if there is an unexpected result, even though there was no
unexpected cause, such as a slip, fall or misstep, in order to constitute an
"accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law .... [An
unexpected injury received in the ordinary performance of a duty in the usual
manner is an injury "by accident" within the purview of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law. ...
Id. (emphasis supplied by court).
11. Ch. 28238, § 1, 1953 Fla. Laws 844 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18)(1977)).
The Florida Legislature undertook a comprehensive revision of the Florida workmen's com-
pensation law during the 1979 legislative session. This revision included changing the name
of the act from the Workmen's Compensation Act to the Workers' Compensation Act.
12. Wilhelm v. Westminster Presbyterian Church, 235 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1970).
13. Simmons v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1966).
14. Worden v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 256 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1972).
15. Salazar v. Jules Gillette, Inc.. 243 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1971).
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engaged in the strenuous work of loading over one hundred cases of
whiskey from a conveyor line to a truck. The Florida Supreme Court
held that a heart attack was not a compensable injury if it occurred
as a result of the usual work of the employee, even when that work
customarily entailed physical exertion. The court adopted a rule
requiring unusual strain or exertion for compensability of heart at-
tacks." Therefore, the claimant was denied compensation, because
there was no strain or exertion that was unusual to the work he
customarily performed. 7
However, the rule of Victor Wine had been limited in application
only to heart attack cases. Thus, when a claimant suffered a rup-
tured aneurysm of the aortic artery as a result of lifting cases to a
higher shelf, he was awarded benefits even though the strain was not
unusual to his employment. 8 Following the supreme court's deci-
sion in Tracy v. Americana Hotel,9 the Industrial Relations Com-
mission perceived the Victor Wine case as pertaining only to heart
attacks, and quoted that decision to support its finding of compen-
sability for the ruptured aneurysm.2"
In Tracy, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the Industrial Rela-
tions Commission order denying benefits to a claimant who had
suffered a ruptured aneurysm and subsequent brain damage.2' The
ruptured aneurysm was the result of a significant rise in the claim-
ant's blood pressure during her employment. The Florida Supreme
16. The Florida Supreme Court stated:
When disabling heart attacks are involved and where such heart conditions are
precipitated by work-connected exertion affecting a pre-existing non-disabling
heart disease, said injuries are compensable only if the employee was at the time
subject to unusual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work he was
accustomed to performing.
141 So. 2d at 588-89.
17. Id. at 583-84. See Simmons v. Stanley, 197 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1967), for a typical decision
based on the Victor Wine rationale (claimant suffered a heart attack after unloading and
stacking one hundred and seventy-five fifty-pound cases of canned goods over a two-day
period, but was denied benefits; evidence showed that he customarily stacked one hundred
to one hundred and twenty-five cases in a single day, so there was no unusual strain).
18. Zayre Corp. v. Urrechaga, 7 F.C.R. 185 (IRC 1972), cert. denied, 271 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
1972).
19. 234 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
20. It is therefore settled beyond question in this state that an internal failure,
such as a strained muscle, ruptured disc, "snapped" kneecap, and the like, brought
about by exertion in the performance of the regular or usual duties of the employ-
ment, may be found to be an injury "by accident," without the necessity of showing
that such injury was preceded by some incident such as a slip, fall or blow.
7 F.C.R. at 186 (quoting 141 So. 2d at 588).
21. The claimant, a hotel chamber maid, was irritated because she had to make an
additional trip to the supply room for more linen near quitting time. As she continued her
work in an emotionally agitated state, she "snapped" a sheet across the bed that she was
making, and immediately afterwards she sustained a ruptured aneurysm. 234 So. 2d at 642.
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Court awarded compensation benefits, relying on Williams v. Ter-
razzo Associates, which held that "it is incumbent on a claimant,
in order to receive compensation, to show only that he sustained
injury as an unexpected result flowing from the performance of his
employment activities. '22
In determining the compensability of Mosca's ruptured aneu-
rysm, the Florida Supreme Court could have ruled in favor of com-
pensation on the basis of its prior holdings in Tracy and Direct Oil
Corp. v. Coleman.23 The court awarded full compensation in both
cases for the rupture of a preexisting aneurysm. In Direct Oil Corp.,
the court stated that "the fact that no rupture would have occurred
without the aneurysm, a pre-existing nondisabling congenital weak-
ness, is wholly irrelevant to the determination of compensability
... ."1 This position is consistent with Florida's law that the em-
ployer takes the employee as he finds him, 25 and with the compensa-
bility of other types of internal injuries, such as a herniated disc. 6
The factual situation of Mosca was very similar to that of Tracy:
both of the claimants had a medical history of hypertension; they
both were performing their usual employment in an agitated emo-
tional state; neither claimant performed any physical activity re-
quiring unusual physical strain or overexertion; both suffered a
rupture of a preexisting aneurysm during the course of their em-
ployment. However, while Tracy's injury was fully compensable,
Mosca's injury was held to be not compensable. The Florida Su-
preme Court reversed its position, applying the standard of the
Victor Wine case, for the first time, to injuries other than heart
attacks. 27
No reason or statement was given in support of the court's sudden
reversal from its established position, except that the court con-
cluded "that the same rationale for requiring a stricter rule in heart
cases is also applicable to other internal failures of the cardiovascu-
lar system." Since the court supplied no such rationale, this state-
ment presumably referred to the rationale from Victor Wine sup-
22. 224 So. 2d 257, 258 (Fla. 1968).
23. 216 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
24. Id. at 194.
25. See Davis v. Artley Constr. Co., 18 So. 2d 255, 258 (Fla. 1944), in which the court held
that "[riecovery of compensation by a claimant for an injury is not conditioned on good or
perfect health . . . . The employer accepts the employee in such physical condition as he
finds him and assumes the risk of a diseased condition aggravated by injury."
26. See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Westminster Presbyterian Church, 235 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1970).
27. [Blefore a ruptured aneurysm can qualify as an accident arising out of
employment, the rupture must be shown to have been caused by an unusual strain
or overexertion by the claimant resulting from a specifically identifiable effort by
him not routine to the type of work he is accustomed to performing.
362 So. 2d at 1342.
28. Id.
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porting a more restrictive standard. Yet the court in Victor Wine
also failed to provide a rationale for its decision to require unusual
strain or overexertion in order for an injury to be compensable; the
court merely modified the holding from a prior case"5 that had been
overruled in part nine years earlier. 3° The court in Victor Wine
limited its decision to "heart attacks" when it expressed the
adopted standard for "heart cases." Rather than including other
defects of the cardivascular system, the Victor Wine court ex-
pressly limited its decision to "heart disease" injuries when it later
explained the application of the rule'.3
In determining ruptured aneurysms to be within the same cate-
gory of injuries as heart attacks, the court in Mosca seemed io ignore
the medical fact that the two injuries are quite different and often
can be attributed to dissimilar causes. While the court may have
been correct in stating that emotional strain cannot be isolated as
the sole cause of a heart attack, 2 there is a sufficient causal relation-
ship between emotional stress and high blood pressure in a hyper-
tensive person for it to be generally recognized that emotional stress
often results in an increase in blood pressure.33 It is also generally
recognized that an elevation in blood pressure can be the precipitat-
ing cause of a ruptured aneurysm. 34 Since the court did not give a
reason for combining heart attacks and aneurysms under the Victor
Wine rule, it is possible to speculate that the decision was based
solely on the court's desire to limit the number of future determina-
tions of compensability based on such nonquantifiable factors as
emotional strain. Such a limitation is precisely the result of the
court's decision, despite the fact that there may be evidence suffi-
cient to support a finding that emotional strain was the precipitat-
ing cause of the disability.
The court could have modified the law from Tracy to allow com-
pensation only when the cardiovascular failure was caused, in whole
or part, by customary physical exertion in conjunction with emo-
tional stress. The court in Mosca hinted at this requirement when
it stated "in no case have we held emotional strain alone to be
sufficient. 35 However, this statement is ambiguous because only
29. Cleary Bros. Constr. Co. v. Nobles, 23 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1945).
30. Gray v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 64 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1953), overruled that
portion of Cleary Bros. which required a literal accident, such as a slip or fall, for an injury
to be compensable.
31. 141 So. 2d at 588-89.
32. 362 So. 2d at 1342.
33. Isaacs, Occupation, Trauma and Cardiovascular Disease, 5 LAWYER'S MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA 162-63 (1960); McLaughlin, Summary of the Legal Problem, id. at 195.
34. 3B R.N. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 91.52 (3d ed. 1978).
35. 362 So. 2d at 1342.
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heart attack cases have been decided using the Victor Wine stan-
dard.M The court's prior aneurysm decisions 37 were not based on
unusual physical strain or overexertion, as required by the Victor
Wine rule for compensability. The Tracy decision was based on a
finding of an injury caused by an emotional state, anger, coupled
with a customary physical act, "snapping" a sheet. The court in
Mosca indicated that it was receding from the Tracy decision, 3 but
it did not clarify to what extent Tracy was no longer valid. The court
neglected to say whether Mosca's ruptured aneurysm would have
been compensable if he had been experiencing unusual
employment-related emotional stress while engaged in some usual
physical exertion customary to his employment.
After ruling that the standard from Victor Wine would be applied,
the court in Mosca stated that emotional strain was not measurable
enough to be used as a determining factor in establishing a causal
relationship between the injury and the employment. 3 However,
the rationale offered by the court to buttress its statement concern-
ing emotional strain was a discussion of prior cases involving claim-
ants who had suffered heart attacks, 0 since only heart attacks had
been subject to the Victor Wine rule. The court had ignored the
distinction between causation of heart attacks and ruptured aneu-
rysms.
If Mosca is intended as a categorical denial of relief for injuries
resulting from emotional strain which is not accompanied by un-
usual physical strain or overexertion not customary to the employ-
ment, then the court has failed to provide for compensation benefits
for injuries which may be primarily caused by emotional strain. The
law in Florida requires not only that the burden of proof for noncom-
pensability be on the employer/insurer,4 but also that the Workers'
Compensation Act be liberally construed and doubts always re-
36. The supreme court in Mosca ignored its opinion in Harbor Island Spa v. Barlow, 139
So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1962), in which it granted an award, requiring apportionment for preexisting
disease, to a claimant who had suffered a heart attack as the result of employment-related
emotional stress.
37. E.g., Direct Oil Corp. v. Coleman, 216 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968); Tracy v. Americana
Hotel, 234 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
38. 362 So. 2d at 1342 n.2.
39. "Emotional strain is too elusive a factor to be utilized, independent of any physical
activity, in determining whether there is a causal connection between a heart attack or other
internal failure of the cardiovascular system and the claimant's employment." Id. at 1342.
40. Id. at 1342-44.
41. This court is committed to the doctrine that when a serious injury is conclu-
sively shown and a logical cause for it is proven, he who seeks to defeat recovery
for the injury has the burden of overcoming the established proof and showing that
another cause of the injury is more logical and consonant with reason.
Sanford v. A.P. Clark Motors, 45 So. 2d 185, 187 (Fla. 1950) (citation omitted).
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solved in favor of the worker.2 Thus, such a categorical denial of
relief seems to contradict established principles of the Florida work-
ers' compensation law.
A more rational alternative may have been for the court to require
that the preexisting disability be apportioned out of the resulting
disability, with a corresponding reduction in the compensation
award, as provided for in the Workers' Compensation Act. 3 The
holding in Tracy, that the preexisting aneurysm should not be ap-
portioned,44 would be overruled. As the law existed under Tracy and
Mosca, there would still be no apportionment for the preexisting
condition, and full compensation could be awarded if there was an
accompanying unusual physical exertion. This would be true even
if the physical exertion was less a cause of the injury than the
emotional stress was and if no disability would have resulted but for
the preexisting physical defect.
A suggested explanation for the decision in Mosca may be the
desire by the court to limit the inflationary spiral effect of higher
compensation insurance premiums by eliminating an area of com-
pensation that is usually the result of preexisting defects that are
often congenital or not related to employment. The Florida Su-
preme Court has noted in the past that the compensation laws are
not intended to be a form of general public health or accident insur-
ance.45 The court recently denied benefits to a claimant who suffered
a disabling injury as a result of a congenital abnormality in her
lower back." Although the injury occurred during the claimant's
employment, the court did not look to the legal issue of whether the
claimant suffered an injury, but instead cited a decision by an Ari-
zona intermediate appellate court47 in ruling that there was no
causal connection between the injury and the employment. Al-
though a causal connection has not been a consistent requirement
for compensability in previous cases, the court stated that "[w]e
cannot permit the Commission to convert the workmen's compensa-
42. See, e.g., Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, Inc., 74 So. 2d 282, 286 (Fla. 1954).
43. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18) (1977) provides that "[wihere a preexisting disease or anom-
aly is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment,
only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attribut-
able to the accident shall be compensable with respect to permanent disability or death."
The 1979 Workers' Compensation Act amended this section to provide that "[wihere a
preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggravated by accident arising out of and in
the course of employment and resulting in death, only acceleration of death reasonably
attributable to the accident shall be compensable." Ch. 79-40, § 2, 1979 Fla. Laws 215. The
implications of this amendment are beyond the scope of this comment.
44. 234 So. 2d at 643.
45. E.g., Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581, 583 (Fla. 1962).
46. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1978).
47. Sacks v. Industrial Comm'n, 474 P.2d 442 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
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tion statute into a mandatory general health insurance policy which
does not limit the burden on industry to those ailments produced
even remotely by the hazards of industry."" This statement may be
the key to the court's refusal to award compensation benefits in
Mosca; it is possible that the same rationale, though not identified
in the opinion, underlies the court's decision.
The Florida Supreme Court in Mosca has significantly altered the
standards concerning compensability for injuries resulting from in-
ternal failures of the cardiovascular system. A more stringent test
will determine the award made to an employee whose disability was
primarily caused by an emotional strain or a preexisting physical
defect. The court has emphasized that it now requires a direct
causal relationship between the employment and the employee's
disability. However, by not providing a rationale that would clarify
the court's reasoning and delineate the limits of the decision, the
court has invited future litigation to define the extent to which
Tracy v. Americana Hotel is no longer valid. The decision indicates
a trend toward a compensation law that will be construed less liber-
ally for the claimant.
CARL D. INSKEEP
48. _Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. 1978).
